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                                          NOT PRECEDENTIAL  
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
No.  17-2061 
   




STAFFORD TOWNSHIP;  
POLICE CHIEF JOSEPH GIBERSON, In his Individual and Official Capacities; 
JOHN DOES 1-5, Individually and in their official capacity 
 
      Police Chief Joseph Giberson, 
                               Appellant    
    
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No.: 3-13-cv-01091) 
District Judge:  Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
      
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on November 15, 2017 
 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, VANASKIE, and FUENTES Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 1, 2018) 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N* 
   
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P.  5.7 




FUENTES, Circuit Judge:  
 Defendant-Appellant Joseph Giberson, the now-retired Police Chief of Stafford 
Township, presided over the promotion process for candidates for promotion to police 
sergeant.  Among these candidates was Plaintiff-Appellee Joseph Mrazek, who also 
served as president of the police union.  Mrazek sued Giberson, among others, for 
retaliating against him in the promotion process for his union affiliation.  
Denying summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity, the District Court 
held that Mrazek’s right to be free from a public official “negatively influencing a police 
promotion process solely because of [his] union-related activities (resulting in his being 
passed over for a promotion)” was clearly established.1  For the following reasons, we 
will affirm. 
I. 
Because we write only for the parties, we include only those facts most necessary 
to the disposition of the case. 
Candidates for promotion to sergeant, among other ranks, were evaluated in a two-
part process that included both objective and subjective components.  Based on this 
process, a certain portion of candidates were ranked and were promoted in that order as 
openings arose.  In total, the objective component of the evaluation comprised 80 percent 
of a candidate’s evaluation and the subjective component comprised 20 percent.  The 
                                              
1 Mrazek v. Stafford Township, et al.., No. CV 13-1091, 2017 WL 1788655, at *4 (D.N.J. 
May 5, 2017) (hereinafter Mrazek II). 
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subjective component contained two equally weighted scores: 10 percent of the 
candidate’s evaluation derived from an evaluation conducted by Giberson alone and the 
remaining 10 percent derived from the “Supervisory Roundtable,” a discussion of the 
department’s supervisory employees that results in a ranking collectively arrived at by the 
participants.  Giberson was among the participants in the Supervisory Roundtable. 
Mrazek, a police officer and President of the local Police Benevolent Association 
Union, was a candidate for the 2012/2013 promotional exam for the rank of sergeant.  
The promotion exam consisted of two components, Phase I and Phase II.  Both phases 
included parts of the objective component, but only Phase II contained the subjective 
component described above.  Phase I consisted of a multiple choice exam that was 
independently graded by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.  It also 
included half of a candidate’s “seniority score.”  Only the top “50 percentile” of officers 
who completed Phase I could progress to Phase II, which included assessment of oral and 
written responses as well as the subjective component of the exam.2  In part due to 
ranking last in the subjective component of the exam, Mrazek was ranked seventh of 
eleven in the promotion list and, as of the briefing of this case, was not promoted. 
The District Court held that there were disputed issues of material fact as to 
Giberson’s “substantial motivating factor in scoring Mrazek last during the Roundtable 
and the Chief’s Review phases of the Exam.”3  All we must determine is whether 
Mrazek’s right was clearly established: whether, as the District Court phrased it: “a 
                                              
2 A513. 
3 Mrazek I, 2016 WL 5417197, at *15. 
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reasonable public official could have recognized that negatively influencing a police 
promotion process solely because of an officer candidate’s union related activities 
(resulting in his being passed over for a promotion) would violate the officer’s First 
Amendment freedom to associate rights” in January 2013, when Giberson’s conduct 
occurred.4 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 
U.S.C. § 1343.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the collateral 
order doctrine. 
The collateral order doctrine is an exception to appellate review’s usual 
requirement of a final decision.  We will exercise jurisdiction over a non-final order that 
“[1] conclusively determine[s] the disputed question, [2] resolve[s] an important issue 
completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] [is] effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment.”5  “[A] denial of qualified immunity that turns on an issue 
of law—rather than a factual dispute—falls within the collateral order doctrine.”6 
Here, the only issue before us is whether Mrazek’s right as recognized by the 
District Court was clearly established at the time of Giberson’s disputed conduct.  This 
question is purely legal, and the collateral order doctrine applies. 
  
                                              
4 Mrazek II, 2017 WL 1788655, at *4. 
5 Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. and Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 
2016) (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006)). 




We exercise plenary review over a grant of summary judgment.7  We apply the 
same standard of the District Court,8 and draw all reasonable inferences from the record 
in favor of the non-moving party.9  We also exercise plenary review of the legal grounds 
underpinning a claim of qualified immunity.10 
IV. 
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense designed to “protect government 
officials from insubstantial claims in order to ‘shield officials from harassment, 
distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’”11  “When properly 
applied, it protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the 
law.’”12  It prohibits a plaintiff from recovering money damages against a federal or state 
official unless a plaintiff shows “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional 
right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged 
conduct.”13  Only the second prong of this analysis is before us here. 
For a right to be clearly established, “there must be sufficient precedent at the time 
of action, factually similar to the plaintiff’s allegations, to put defendants on notice that 
                                              
7 Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 512 (3d Cir. 2018). 
8 Id. 
9 Goldenstein v. Repossessors, Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2016). 
10 Karns, 879 F.3d at 512. 
11 Mammaro, 814 F.3d at 168 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). 
12 Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 
341 (1986)). 
13 Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
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his or her conduct is constitutionally prohibited.”14  The contours of the right must be 
“sufficiently clear that ‘a reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing 
violates that right.’”15  The precise conduct at issue need not previously be held to be 
unlawful provided that the contours of the right are sufficiently clear.16  The Supreme 
Court has made clear that “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates 
established law even in novel factual circumstances.”17 
The District Court correctly concluded that Mrazek’s right to be free of a public 
official negatively influencing a police promotion process solely because of Mrazek’s 
union-related activities, resulting in his non-promotion, was clearly established in January 
2013. 
That the rights afforded by the First Amendment protect the pursuit of affiliation 
with a union is clearly established in law.18  Similarly, the First Amendment protects the 
right of associations, such as unions, “to engage in advocacy on behalf of their 
                                              
14 Mammaro, 814 F.3d at 169 (quoting McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 572 (3d Cir. 
2001)). 
15 Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 449–50 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Rivas v. City of 
Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 200 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
16 Kedra, 876 F.3d at 450 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 
17 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). 
18 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (“In sum, we hold that, in a 
case such as this, absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, 
a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish 
the basis for his dismissal from public employment.”); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 
485–86 (1960) (“It is not disputed that to compel a teacher to disclose his every 
associational tie is to impair that teacher's right of free association, a right closely allied 




members.”19  “The government is prohibited from infringing upon these guarantees either 
by a general prohibition against certain forms of advocacy . . . or by imposing sanctions 
for the expression of particular views it opposes.”20 
For a quarter-century prior to the conduct in dispute, this Court has held that when 
public employers take adverse employment actions such as “retaliatory discharges, 
transfers, letters of reprimand, . . . demotions accompanied by transfers, . . . [and] 
retaliatory demotions” against employees, those public officials violate the clearly 
established rights of their employees.21 
It is equally established by Supreme Court precedent that even though a public 
employee has no legal entitlement to promotion, the government “may not deny a benefit 
to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, 
his interest in freedom of speech.”22  It held in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois that 
“promotions, transfers, and recalls after layoffs based on political affiliation or support 
are an impermissible infringement on the First Amendment rights of public employees.”23  
Although Rutan dealt with partisan political affiliation and not union affiliation, the 
clearly established right to associate and affiliate with a union derives from the same 
source as the First Amendment protection of the right to affiliate with a union.  The 
                                              
19 Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emp., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 464 (1979) (citing Nat’l 
Assoc. for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)). 
20 Smith, 441 U.S. at 464 (citations omitted).  
21 Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 733 (3d Cir. 1987). 
22 Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 72 (1990) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 
357 U.S.  513, 526 (1958)). 
23 Rutan, 497 U.S. at 75. 
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following propositions of law are thus clearly established: union affiliation is protected 
from infringement under the First Amendment; and a retaliatory decision not to promote 
an employee on a protected basis can constitute infringement of First Amendment rights.   
These well-established precedents are supported by holdings from the Courts of 
Appeals.24  McGreevey v. Stroup, in particular, is instructive: in that case, this Court held 
that giving an employee an unsatisfactory employment rating violated the employee’s 
clearly established First Amendment right, if it was proven that the rating was motivated 
by retaliation for speaking on a matter of public concern.25  Although the employee was 
eventually terminated, the Court’s holding concerned the rating alone, and left it to a jury 
to determine “whether Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected activity was a substantial or 
motivating factor in Defendant’s decision [to give the low rating].”26 
The right at issue here synthesizes the precedents of McGreevey and Rutan: 
Mrazek claims that Giberson’s negative employment rating at a critical juncture led to 
Mrazek being passed over for promotion.  In light of these clearly established precedents, 
a reasonable public official could—and should—have recognized that negatively 
influencing a police promotion process solely because of an officer candidate’s union-
related activities (resulting in his being passed over for a promotion) would violate the 
                                              
24 See, e.g., McGreevey v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that retaliatory 
unsatisfactory employment rating infringed on employee’s First Amendment rights); 
Shrum v. City of Coweta, Okla., 449 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that retaliatory 
changes in work schedule infringed on employee’s First Amendment rights).  
25 McGreevey, 413 F.3d at 366–67. 
26 Id. at 365–66.  
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officer’s First Amendment freedom to associate rights in January 2013, when Giberson’s 
conduct occurred.27 
V. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court. 
                                              
27 See Mrazek II, 2017 WL 1788655, at *4. 
